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Abstract
Mafia (also called Werewolf) is a party game. The participants are divided into two
competing groups: citizens and a mafia. The objective is to eliminate the opponent
group. The game consists of two consecutive phases (day and night) and a certain
set of actions (e.g. lynching during day). The mafia members have additional powers
(knowing each other, killing during night) whereas the citizens are more numerous.
We propose a simple mathematical model of the game, which is essentially a pure
death process with discrete time. We find the closed-form solutions for the mafia
winning-chance w(n,m) as well as for the evolution of the game. Moreover, we investi-
gate the discrete properties of results, as well as their continuous-time approximations.
It turns out that a relatively small number of the mafia members, i.e. proportional
to the square root of the total number of players, gives equal winning-chance for both
groups. Furthermore, the game strongly depends on the parity of the total number of
players.
1 Introduction
Mafia (also called Werewolf) is a popular party game [1]. The participants collect in a
circle and a game coordinator assigns each player to one of two groups: a mafia or citizens.
Citizens know only their own identity, whereas mafia members know identity of their fellows.
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The objective is to eliminate the opponent group. The game consists of two alternating
phases (day and night). During the day, all players can discuss and vote who they want to
lynch. During the night the mafia kills a citizen of their choice.
There are many variants of the Mafia game. A typical modification of the gameplay is
the addition of characters with special abilities. For example, two common special citizens
are: Detective (who checks every night if a chosen person is in the mafia) and Nurse (who
may protect a victim from being killed, if she chooses correctly).
In this paper we analyze the simplest version of the Mafia game: with only mafia and
citizens, and without any special players or additional rules. Even if it may not be the most
popular variant, it is the best one for mathematical modeling. Despite the game having
a complex psychological component it is possible to create a stochastic model of the Mafia
game. That is, we focus on a game where all killings are at random, with decisions unaffected
by the previous game course. It is a great simplification, and is going to follow only when
participants fail to observe others’ behavior, or make use of this information. However, even
such a baseline model gives non-trivial predictions.
We consider a game beginning with n players, out of which there are m mafia members.
The main questions we address are:
• What is the probability that the mafia wins w(n,m)?
• How do we expect the game to play out? That is, what is the chance that after a given
time there is exactly a certain number of mafia members?
Besides the direct answers (i.e. closed form expressions), we study approximations, qualita-
tive behavior and some special cases.
It turns out that a relatively small number of the mafia members , i.e. proportional to
the square root of the total number of players, gives equal winning-chance for both groups.
Furthermore, the game strongly depends on the parity of the total number of players.
There are only a few previous papers on the Mafia game. Work of Braverman, Etesami
and Mossel [2] basically proposes the same model as the one presented in this paper. They
calculate a simple asymptotic formula for the mafia-winning chance, w(n,m) ∝ m/√n. We
go a few steps further, finding the closed form expressions and parity-dependent asymptotic
approximations and also analyzing the dynamical properties.
Other research projects concentrate on the psychological aspect of the Mafia game, in
particular — deceiving. Topics analyzed include: patterns of a deceiver’s interruptions and
voice parameters [3], movement of face and hands [4] and usage of language [5]. Also, the
Mafia game is applied as a test for some videoconferencing setups [6].
The research is motivated by two goals, besides the sheer fun of calculation and writing.
First, a good theoretical model may be useful for the investigation of the psychological aspect
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of the Mafia game. Experimental deviations from the idealized behavior may give a valuable
insight into psychology of strategy choosing, manipulation, deceiving, following others and
hiding identity. Second, when a small, but well-informed and powerful group fights against
the majority, the nature of the process may be similar to that of the Mafia game — e.g. in
high-stake corruption, terrorism and illegal oppositions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the rules of the Mafia
game and propose a simple mathematical model. Section 3 contains a special case of play
with only a single mafia member. The results are not only simple and didactic, but also
useful for a more general case. Section 4 gives simple results on the qualitative behavior of
the mafia-winning chance. Section 5 presents the dynamical aspect of the Mafia game and
gives closed-form expressions for dynamics of the game. We consider both the discrete-time
model and its continuous time approximation. In Section 6 we provide the exact result for
the mafia-winning chance, together with its asymptotic approximation. Section 7 concludes
the work and gives insight into possible extensions and applications. Appendices A and B
contain derivations of formulas found in Sec. 5.
2 Model
Before proceeding to mathematics, we need to write down our arbitrarily chosen rules
of the Mafia game. Some assumptions are made to simplify the model, others purely for
convenience. Note that this Section is only a hand-waving transition from the real-life game
to its mathematical model.
• The game needs n players and one more person to coordinate it.
• At the beginning players are randomly divided into (n − m) citizens and m mafia
members.
• Mafia members know the identity of each other, citizens — only their own.
• There are two alternating phases, day and night, which together comprise a turn.
• During day, there are two consecutive subphases:
– Debate. Everyone still alive can say anything related to accusing or defending.
– Voting. Everyone has one vote for who should be lynched. The player who gets
the highest number of votes is eliminated (in case of a tie, a random ’winner’ is
eliminated). The victim’s faction is revealed.
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• During the night:
– Mafia jointly decides who they want to kill (eliminate).
• The game continues until there is only one group (either the citizens or the mafia) left.
That group wins.
Stated briefly, during the day one player is eliminated (either a citizen or a mafia member)
whereas during the night the mafia kills one citizen. Consequently, during a single turn the
possible transitions are: (n,m)→ (n−2, m) and (n,m)→ (n−2, m−1). Their probabilities,
in principle, depend on n, m and the course of the play (i.e. previous debates and votings).
To start with, we need to get rid of the psychological aspect, restricting ourselves only
to strategic and probabilistic parts of the Mafia game. It is a coarse approximation, as
psychology plays an essential role in the Mafia game. Nevertheless, even such a bare model
has interesting properties. Moreover, we want to neglect the debate phase as it is extremely
difficult to formalize in a meaningful and useful way.
Now, let’s make a hand-waving argument why the transition probability depends only
on the current state (n,m). Consider the scenario, in which players are lynched at random.
The lynching victim is a member of the mafia with probability m/n, so
P [(n− 2, m)|(n,m)] = n−m
n
and P [(n− 2, m− 1)|(n,m)] = m
n
. (1)
Let’s denote by w(n,m) the mafia-winning chance with random lynchings, induced by the
above transition probabilities.
Suppose that there is a better strategy (in the common sense of the word) for citizens,
giving it w′(n,m) < w(n,m). Then the mafia can force a random lynch, just by pretending
they are citizens, that is, acting during the debate and the voting phases in the same way
as citizens do. It is possible as:
• Each mafia member knows more than any citizen.
• In such case there is no way to detect a mafia member.
Bear in mind that the second point works only in a game with no psychological part, when
neither voting scheme nor behavior gives no trace of one’s faction. For example, no-one is
going to turn red when accused of being in the mafia.
Suppose that there is a better strategy for the mafia, w′′(n,m) > w(n,m). If the citizens
are in majority, they can force a random lynching by the following procedure:
• One citizen says "let every of us give a number ki from 1 to n, we will kill the
∑
ki mod
n-th".
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• The number ∑ ki mod n is random, so is the chosen player.
• Every citizen to vote for the unlucky person whose number comes up.
• As there are more citizens than mafia members, the mafia votes do not play any role.
If the citizens are in the minority (i.e. m > n − m) no matter what the moves are,
the mafia will win. For m = n − m let’s assume a random player is lynched. If using
explicit randomness is not forbidden — instead of the sum-mod-n game (similar to a child’s
counting-out game, when numbers are shown with fingers) a citizen can roll a n-sided die or
provide n straws (with one shorter, indicating the victim).
Consequently, random lynch is a well-justified strategy. A more detailed argument is
shown in [2]. Of course in the real world it would be really boring to play the Mafia game in
such way. But well, since we dropped the psychological side, we neglect ’boredom’ as well.
Moreover, even if players do not play lynching at random, the effective choices may result
in probabilities similar to that of our idealized model. As a direct consequence of (1), the
mafia winning-chance can be expressed as a recurrence equation
w(n,m) =


0 if m = 0,
1 if m > n−m,
n−m
n
w(n− 2, m) + m
n
w(n− 2, m− 1) in all other cases.
(2)
The above equation is the core of our paper. We investigate it for one mafia member, its
qualitative behavior and closed-form solution along with its asymptotic formula.
It is important to point out that we may set different boundary conditions, i.e. in which
if there is the same number of citizens and mafia members, mafia wins. That is, in (2) we
may write (1 if m ≥ n − m) instead of (1 if m > n − m). In that case all results can be
reproduced, perhaps in a slightly changed form (i.e. different constants and even↔odd).
3 Game with one mafia member
To start with, we want to consider a very simple case — the game with only a single
mafia member. That is, in this Section we analyze w(n, 1). Besides the simplicity, there are
two more motivations: this case gives insight into some general properties and the results
will be useful in the further part of the paper.
In a game with one mafia member, their winning probability is the chance that during
every lynch a citizen is killed. Bearing in mind that we start the game with the day phase,
we get
w(n, 1) =
n− 1
n
· n− 3
n− 2 · . . . ·
1 + (n mod 2)
2 + (n mod 2)
=
(n− 1)!!
n!!
, (3)
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Figure 1: A numerical plot of the probability that the mafia wins w(n,m).
where n!! is the double factorial of n. The above formula has an explicit dependence on
the parity of n. Even though it is obvious that addition of 2 citizens reduces mafia-winning
chance w(n+2, 1) < w(n, 1), it is not the case for addition of a single citizen. In fact, adding
another player to make the total odd (holding m = 1) increases the mafia-winning chance.
To understand this let’s use an example. In a play with one citizen and one mafia member,
there is tie in voting, so lynching relies on tossing a coin and w(2, 1) = 1/2. In a game with
two citizens, the mafia also wins after lynching a citizen (the second one is to be killed during
the night). This time it is more difficult to hunt mafia, and w(3, 1) = 2/3. One may think
that we encountered an issue of boundary conditions (i.e. killing a random player in a tie)
or that we considered too small n. Neither is the case. A careful reader may easily check
that changing (1 if m > n−m) to (1 if m ≥ n−m) in (2) we get an analogous phenomena.
We may simply check that adding an odd player always increases the mafia winning-
chance. Let’s prove it by induction. As the base we use w(3, 1) > w(2, 1). Then for the
inductive assumption w(2k + 1, 1) > w(2k, 1) we need to show that w(2(k + 1) + 1, 1) >
w(2(k + 1), 1):
w(2k + 3, 1) =
2k + 2
2k + 3
w(2k + 1, 1) >
2k + 1
2k + 2
w(2k + 1, 1) (4)
>
2k + 1
2k + 2
w(2k, 1) = w(2k + 2, 1).
Consequently, we have proved by mathematical induction that w(2k + 1, 1) > w(2k, 1) for
every k > 0.
Let’s consider w(n, 1) averaged over neighboring numbers. We use the geometric mean,
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as it simplifies the result
√
w(n− 1, 1)w(n, 1) =
√
(n− 2)!!
(n− 1)!!
(n− 1)!!
n!!
=
1√
n
. (5)
The averaging may be considered an approximation in which we get a monotonic function
(without the sawtooth pattern). To get some information on the dependence of w(n, 1) on
the parity of n we consider the following ratio
w(2k + 1, 1)
w(2k, 1)
=
(2k)!!
(2k + 1)!!
/
(2k − 1)!!
(2k)!!
=
(
(2k)!!
(2k − 1)!!
)2
1
2k + 1
. (6)
The above expression has a limit when k goes to infinity, which can be found with the aid
of the Wallis formula:
pi
2
= lim
k→∞
(
(2k)!!
(2k − 1)!!
)2
1
2k + 1
. (7)
We may develop approximate formulas for the single mafia member winning-chance,
which take into account parity of the number of players
w(2k, 1) =
(
w(2k + 1, 1)
w(2k, 1)
)− 1
2 √
w(2k, 1)w(2k + 1, 1) (8)
≈
√
2
pi
1√
2k + 1
,
w(2k + 1, 1) =
(
w(2k + 1, 1)
w(2k, 1)
) 1
2 √
w(2k, 1)w(2k + 1, 1)
≈
√
pi
2
1√
2k + 1
.
Or, bearing in mind (n+ 1)/n→ 1,
w(n, 1) ≈
(pi
2
)(n mod 2)−1/2 1√
n
. (9)
As we see, the recurrence equation produces results that might be counter-intuitive.
Imagine there are four of us and we are playing with a single mafia member. His winning-
chance is w(4, 1) = 3
8
= 0.375. Then we invite five more friends to play as additional citizens.
Consequently, the mafia winning-chance rise to w(9, 1) = 128
315
≈ 0.406 (contrary to a naive
expectation).
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Figure 2: Plot of the mafia winning-chance for a game with a single mafia member, that is
w(n, 1). Dots illustrate the exact result (3), whereas the lines represent the approximations
(9) — solid and dashed line for even and odd number of players, respectively.
4 Qualitative properties of w(n,m)
Given the surprising effect of adding an additional citizen to a one-mafia-member game,
some more questions naturally arise:
• Does the addition of two citizens increase their winning-chance, i.e. is w(n + 2, m) <
w(n,m)?
• Does the addition of one citizen and one mafia member increase the mafia winning-
chance, i.e. is w(n+ 1, m+ 1) > w(n,m)?
• Does the change of one player from a mafia member to a citizen decrease the mafia
winning-chance, i.e. is w(n,m+ 1) > w(n,m)?
In fact, the above questions are equivalent, as we can see using using the recurrence relation
(2)
w(n,m) =
n−m
n
w(n− 2, m) + m
n
w(n− 2, m− 1)
for n−m ≥ m > 0. After some cosmetic arithmetical operations we get
(n−m) [w(n− 2, m)− w(n,m)] = m [w(n,m)− w(n− 2, m− 1)] , (10)
n [w(n,m)− w(n− 2, m− 1)] = (n−m) [w(n− 2, m)− w(n− 2, m− 1)] .
The above relations can be directly translated into
w(n− 2, m) > w(n,m)⇔ w(n,m) > w(n− 2, m− 1)⇔ w(n− 2, m) > w(n− 2, m− 1).
(11)
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In addition to the equivalence of the ’obvious’ inequalities, we are interested whether they
are fulfilled. Let’s use the third part of (11) as a conjecture, formulating in the following
way:
If a mafia member is changed into a citizen, the mafia winning-chance does not increase,
that is w(n+ 1, m+ 1) ≥ w(n+ 1, m). If additionally n−m ≥ m, the inequality is strong,
w(n+ 1, m+ 1) > w(n+ 1, m).
Let’s introduce an agent to a game with n players among which there are m mafia
members. The agent is an additional player who simulates either a citizen or a mafia member.
We are going to show that the agent does not have to reveal its identity until the very late
part of the game.
As citizens are indistinguishable, let’s assume that mafia kills them during night in a
fixed sequence. Let the agent have the last position. During the lynching there are three
possibilities
• A citizen dies.
• A mafia member dies.
• The agent dies.
In the case of the agent’s death, his affiliation has no meaning. In the two remaining
situations, the game continues with the agent. The agent’s affiliation plays a decisive role in
two situations:
• When all mafia members are dead.
• When 0 or 1 citizens and 1 or 2 mafia members remain.
Note that in a real game, the agent’s previous voting may be important in creating or
breaking ties, not to mention the debate phase. But random voting squashes all of these
considerations. In both cases when the agent is a mafia member, the mafia winning-chance
increase:
Game state (n,m) w if the agent is of citizens w if the agent is of mafia
(n, 0) 0 w(n, 1)
(1, 1) 1
2
1
(2, 1) 1
3
1
(3, 2) 1
4
1
The total mafia winning-chance is equal to the mean winning-chance, averaged over
disjoint games. The weight is the probability of achieving a such game. The change of the
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agent’s affiliation does not affect the weights, but in the ending always increases the mafia
winning-chance, w(n+1, m+1) ≥ w(n+1, m), thus proving our first conjecture. Additionally,
when the citizens outnumber the mafia, there is a game in which all mafia members are killed
and the agent’s affiliation plays a role, hence w(n+ 1, m+ 1) > w(n+ 1, m), which was our
second conjecture
Let’s show one more property — when n−m ≥ m adding an odd player always increases
the mafia winning-chance, not only in games with one mafia member (4). We will use
mathematical induction, using the boundary conditions (2) and the already shown properties
of w(n, 1) as the basis. The inductive assumption is that the property holds for the total
number of players n ≤ 2k + 1, and the inductive step is the following:
w(2(k + 1) + 1, m) =
2k + 3−m
2k + 3
w(2k + 1, m) +
m
2k + 3
w(2k + 1, m− 1) (12)
>
2k + 3−m
2k + 3
w(2k,m) +
m
2k + 3
w(2k,m− 1)
>
2k + 2−m
2k + 2
w(2k,m) +
m
2k + 2
w(2k,m− 1)
= w(2(k + 1), m),
where we subsequently used: the inductive assumption, the previously proven relation
w(2k,m) > w(2k,m − 1) and the fact that (when averaging two components) putting less
weight on the greater term makes the sum lower.
5 Evolution
In two previous Sections we considered the mafia winning-chance with respect to the
initial number of players (N) and mafia members (M). It may be interesting to explore
dynamics of the play, that is, analyze the probability pm(t) that after the t-th turn there
will be exactly m mafia members. Even though this goes beyond the (2), it is a direct
consequence of the random lynching model (1). Throughout this section we use capital
letters N and M to denote the initial conditions.
Note that every turn, or day and night, two players are killed, so the total number of
players decreases n(t) = N − 2t.
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5.1 Discrete time
The evolution of each pm(t) is governed by a set of recurrent equations
pm(t+ 1) =
(N − 2t)−m
N − 2t pm(t) +
m+ 1
N − 2tpm+1(t), (13)
where m ∈ N and with the initial condition pm(0) = δmM .
Note that the above is a stochastic process withM+1 distinct states and (m)→ (m−1).
In general, such a Markov process is called a pure death process (a subclass of birth and
death processes). In our case the transition probabilities change with time, which is a slight
complication.
It is essential to point that the equations in (13) are correct only when m ≤ n(t), that
is, when there is at least one citizen alive and the game can be still played. Otherwise they
have no meaning. But why does an erroneous equation for m > n(t) not spoil states with
m ≤ n(t)? For a given time t let pm(t) be the erroneous probability with the smallest index,
i.e. m = N − 2t + 1. In the next turn it affects pm−1(t + 1). But, now the smallest wrong
index is N − 2(t + 1) + 1 = m − 2 < m − 1. So the error propagates more slowly than the
exclusion of the states.
The closed form solution for pm(t) reads
pm(t) =
M∑
i=m
(
M
i
)(
i
m
)
(−1)i−m (N − 2t)!!
N !!
(N − i)!!
(N − 2t− i)!! (14)
and its derivation is presented in Appendix A. An example is plotted in Fig. 3 (a).
The expression above, although exact, is fairly complicated. Let’s analyze the mean
number of mafia players after t days and nights, that is
〈m〉(t) =
M∑
m=0
mpm(t). (15)
In birth and death processes with transition coefficients proportional to state’s label (as
radioactive decay process or Yule process) such mean may be obtained by a straightforward
calculation with the use of (13)
〈m〉(t) = N − 2t + 1
N − 2t + 2〈m〉(t− 1) =
(
t−1∏
i=0
N − 2i− 1
N − 2i
)
M. (16)
The result is correct only when N−2t−M ≥ 0, that is, the average is taken over probabilities
of the correct states.
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5.2 Continuous time approximation
Usually differential equations are simpler than difference equations. In this Section we
crudely approximate the discrete-time evolution (13) by its continuous-time version. We
know that
pm(t + 1)− pm(t)←−−
∆=1
pm(t +∆)− pm(t)
∆
−−−→
∆→0
d
dt
pm(t). (17)
Let’s change in (13) the difference pm(t+ 1)− pm(t) into the differential ddt p˜m(t)
d
dt
p˜m(t) = − m
N − 2t p˜m(t) +
m+ 1
N − 2t p˜m+1(t), (18)
where m ∈ N and with the initial condition p˜m(0) = δmM . When a relative change of the
function derivative is over unit length interval [t, t + 1], the approximation should be good
p˜m(t) ≈ pm(t). Intuitively speaking, when the chance of lynching a mafia member during
one day is small, such an approximation is justified. However, in the course of this paper we
do not estimate the approximation error.
The solution of the differential equation (18) reads
p˜m(t) =
(
M
m
)(
1−
√
1− 2t
N
)M−m(√
1− 2t
N
)m
, (19)
see Appendix B for a detailed derivation. This is more convenient to work with than the
exact expression (14). An example is plotted in Fig. 3 (a).
For example, maxima of p˜m(t) are easily found
tm =
N
2
(
1−
(m
M
)2)
. (20)
The mean number of mafia players, defined as in (15), is
〈m˜〉(t) = M
√
1− 2t
N
, (21)
which is a simpler expression than its analogue (16). The comparison of the discrete-time
formula with its continuous-time approximation is in Fig. 3 (b).
It is tempting to estimate the mafia winning-chance. As p˜0(t) is the probability that
the citizens won, setting time for which there is only one player left gives the total citizen
12
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Figure 3: Dynamics of the Mafia game for the initial conditions N = 32 and M = 4. We
compare results for the discrete-time evolution with its continuous-time counterparts. (a)
The probability that after t turns there are exactly m mafia members alive — the exact
results pm(t) (dots) and their approximations p˜m(t) (lines). (b) The mean number mafia
members — the discrete result 〈m〉(t) (dots) and its continuous time variant 〈m˜〉(t) (lines).
winning-chance:
w˜(n,m) = 1− p˜0 (n−12 ) = 1−
(
1−
√
1− n− 1
n
)m
(22)
≈ m√
n
.
Not surprisingly, in the continuous-time approximation, there is no explicit dependence on
parity (the discrete properties are lost).
6 General solution
The result for pm(t) (14) is not only interesting by itself — it also gives us the solution
for the mafia winning-chance (2). Note that p0(t) is the probability that after t turns citizens
win. When total number of players is odd, game lasts for todd = (N − 1)/2 days and nights,
leaving 1 player alive. Thus p0(todd) is the probability the citizen win the game. For an even
number of players, after teven = N/2 turns there are no players alive. But now p0(teven) is
the probability that there are no mafia members, so in fact — no-one was killed during the
last night and citizen win. So w(n,m) = 1 − p0(N−N mod 22 ). Consequently, the closed form
13
formula for the mafia winning-chance reads
w(n,m) = 1−
m∑
i=0
(
m
i
)
(−1)i (n− i)!!
n!!((n mod 2)− i)!! . (23)
Let’s show what we have proven for a game with only one mafia member — the asymptotic
behavior (9).
To get the asymptotic formula for w(n,m) it suffices to notice that in the limit n→ ∞
(taken over a selected parity) only the first two terms of the sum contribute. For i = 0
the term is equal to 1. The terms with i > 1 do not matter as (n − i)!!/(n − 1)!! → 0.
Consequently, we may write
w(n,m) ≈ m(n− 1)!!
n!!
(24)
≈
(pi
2
)(n mod 2)−1/2 m√
n
,
where we used the result from game with one mafia member, that is, approximating (3) with
(9). The approximate formula (24) can be formally expressed as w(n,m)
m/
√
m
It is tempting to ask for the optimal number of mafia members mopt, for a given number
of players. An interesting game is one in which both groups have the same chance of winning
mopt ≈ 1
2
(pi
2
)−(n mod 2)+1/2√
n, (25)
which are plotted in Fig. 4. Note that it is only a hand-waving argument, as we applied
an asymptotic formula to a finite n, without investigating how does the convergence depend
on m. Fortunately, for even n the component with i = 2 in the series (23) vanishes as
1/(−2)!! = 0. Consequently, for m2 of order of n (as in (25)) the remaining part goes to zero
as n goes to infinity. Unfortunately, one cannot make the same argument for odd n and for
such case the approximation (25) may not hold.
7 Further remarks
In every realistic Mafia game, there is a psychological part. A dry mathematical model
may be a backbone of a more complex one, but certainly, is not enough to describe a
real game. During course of play, citizens gain some information — either by discovering
another’s identity by themselves, or trying to catch messages. Furthermore, voting may be
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Figure 4: Optimal number of mafia members for a given number of players. Points show
numerical results, that is, number of mafia members mopt for which w(n,mopt) is the closest
to 1/2. Lines show the approximation (25). Squares and solid line are for even number of
players, whereas dots and dashed line — odd.
subject to some kind of witch-hunt mentality. Moreover, rarely are all players the same —
usually there are ones with higher and lower influence on the others.
All these processes may be investigated mathematically, or numerically. There is still a
lot of challenge in finding an appropriate model and obtaining the results. Comparison of
the theory with the experiment may be crucial.
Out of author’s personal experience, in games when players don’t know each other, usually
a random person is killed (e.g. a person who is always nervous, not just because of being in
the mafia). When they know each other very well, very dim signals can be used to reveal
one’s identity.
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A Solution of difference equation for pm(t)
We want to solve the following set of difference equations (13),
pm(t+ 1) =
(N − 2t)−m
N − 2t pm(t) +
m+ 1
N − 2tpm+1(t) : m ∈ Z
with the initial condition pm(0) = δmM . Let’s introduce a generating function
F (t, z) =
∞∑
m=0
pm(t)z
m, (26)
16
with the respective initial condition F (0, z) = zM . After side-by-side multiplication of (13)
by zm and summation we get
F (t+ 1, z) = F (t, z)− z
N − 2t
∂F (t, z)
∂z
+
1
N − 2t
∂F (t, z)
∂z
(27)
=
(
1− z − 1
N − 2t
∂
∂z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(t)
F (t, z).
The linear operator B(t) has the eigenvectors of the form (z − 1)k with the corresponding
eigenvalues (1 − k/(N − 2t)). As the eigenvectors do not depend on t, the computation of
F (t, z) is straightforward:
F (t, z) = B(t− 1)B(t− 2) · · ·B(0)zM (28)
=
M∑
i=0
(
M
i
)
(z − 1)i
(
1− i
N − 2(t− 1)
)(
1− i
N − 2(t− 2)
)
· · ·
(
1− k
N
)
=
M∑
k=0
(
M
i
)
(z − 1)i (N − 2t)!!
N !!
(N − i)!!
(N − 2t− i)!! .
Applying once more the binomial theorem, and comparing the result (28) to the definition
of the generating function (26) we get
pm(t) =
M∑
i=m
(
M
i
)(
i
m
)
(−1)i−m (N − 2t)!!
N !!
(N − i)!!
(N − 2t− i)!! ,
or (14).
B Solution of differential equation for p˜m(t)
We want to solve the following set of differential equations (18),
d
dt
p˜m(t) = − m
N − 2t p˜m(t) +
m+ 1
N − 2t p˜m+1(t) : m ∈ Z,
with the initial condition p˜(0) = δmM . Once again, we employ a generating function
G(t, z) =
∞∑
m=0
p˜m(t)z
m, (29)
17
with the respective initial condition G(0, z) = zM . We get the partial differential equation
∂G(t, z)
∂t
=
(−z + 1)
N − 2t
∂G(t, z)
∂z
, (30)
which we want to solve by the method of characteristics. Let’s have integral curves of G(t, z)
in the form of (t(ϕ), z(ϕ)),
∂G(t, z)
∂t
dt
dϕ
+
∂G(t, z)
∂z
dz
dϕ
= 0. (31)
Comparison of (30) with (31) results in
dt
N − 2t = dϕ =
dz
z − 1 , (32)
or
G(t, z) = f
(
ln
∣∣∣√N − 2t(1− z)∣∣∣) . (33)
All we need is to find a function f(x) that satisfies the initial condition. The explicit form
of the generating function reads
G(t, z) =
(
1−√1− 2t
N
(1− z)
)M
, (34)
which gives the result
p˜m(t) =
(
M
m
)(
1−
√
1− 2t
N
)M−m(√
1− 2t
N
)m
or (19).
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